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When thirty years ago, in 1974, Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1) was 
first released, “Libertarianism” was a word scarcely used in the political discourse. 
Nozick’s book came as an unexpected answer to John Rawls’ ground-breaking A 
Theory of Justice,  (2)  a work that was to re-shape the landscape of contemporary 
political philosophy. (3) 
Nozick’s work bestowed new philosophical dignity upon a set of ideas that was not 
“new” in any meaningful sense; though Libertarianism as a political movement 
emerged in the United States of America precisely during the Seventies, heralded by 
Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia as well as by Murray N. Rothbard’s For a New 
Liberty, (4) with the unforgettable subtitle “A Libertarian Manifesto”, (5) those 
principles to which libertarians gained a new life had long been dancing on the stage of 
history. What’s truly peculiar to the most recent development is the rejection of the 
legitimacy of an even “minimal” government (vis-à-vis the Nozickian solution). 
It is often difficult to distinguish between “Libertarianism” and “Classical Liberalism”. 
Those two labels are used almost interchangeably by those who we may call 
libertarians of a “minarchist” persuasion: scholars who, following Locke and Nozick, 
believe a State is needed in order to achieve effective protection of property rights.  (6) 
Alas, often those who follow Nozick’s footsteps when proposing an “ultra-minimal” 
state end up in what we may dare calling a theoretical impasse; to those who believe 
there is a need for government – but share a fundamental distrust of political power, 
we may suggest that what’s needed is a “voluntarily financed” form of government. (7) 
Machan speaks of the possibility of “the institution of government but with no coercive 
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powers”, considering government with the monopoly of force as a “natural monopoly”. 
 
The monopoly being considered in this context could well be necessary yet not 
coercive. It does not mean that there can only be one government in the world 
but that in any reasonably sized homogeneous geographical area, only one such 
institution makes sense. This is arguable in view of the kind of service 
government (or call it what you will, say, legal authority) is to deliver to citizens, 
its customers), just as some other providers would have a monopoly, at least over 
some period of time (e.g., an airline, while you are traveling, an apartment house, 
a gated community). (8) 
 
Machan does not go as far as explaining how it could be possible to have a government 
without taxation (turning taxation into voluntary fees isn’t an easy accomplishment, 
even for a distinguished philosopher) and, generally speaking, coercion, the peculiar 
activity that distinguishes government from any other agency in society. 
Interestingly, Carlo Lottieri reverses this very argument in his essay included in the 
present issue of Etica & Politica / Ethcis & Politics. Lottieri, following Rothbard, (9) 
Leoni, (10) and Salin, (11) argues for the legitimacy of many so-called “monopolistic 
practices” (cartels, monopolization, mergers, predatory pricing…), and for the 
legitimacy of conglomerates, and big business at large, vis-à-vis those governmental 
agencies built to thoroughly implement “competition” from top to bottom. (12) Thus, 
Lottieri compares private and legal monopolies. The latter have long been the bête 
noire of classical liberals who have always – to mention but one example – opposed 
protectionist measures that favored special interests. Government, being per se the 
source of legal protections, cannot be equated with private sector’s so-called 
“monopolies”. 
These first remarks can bring us to evaluate, however briefly, what constitutes the trait-
d’-union between “Minarchism” and “Anarcho-capitalism” – that is, between the 
tradition that accepts – however minimal – government, and the tradition that rejects it 
within the boundaries of libertarian thought. 
What is shared is, in our opinion, the libertarian theory of justice: a distribution of 
goods, assets and talents in society is legitimate and should be lawful insofar as it is the 
(provisional) last ring in a chain of legitimate acts. “A distribution is just if everyone is 
entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution”. (13) 
Libertarianism is a theory of distributive justice, historical and deontological, whereas 
dominant contemporary theories (such as Rawlsian “liberalism”) are patterned theories 
evaluating distribution by different criteria than its legitimacy in terms of historical 
lawfulness as a chain of legitimate (non-aggressive) acts, and rest upon this or that 
particular set of egalitarian principles. To take advantage of a useful distinction 
developed by Anthony de Jasay, contemporary “liberal” theories of justice are best 
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summarized by the principle “to each, according to …” (his/her race, his/her merits, 
his/her gender, his/her social class, etcetera); whereas libertarianism sticks with the 
maxim “suum cuique” (14) – give to anyone what is due to him: that is, what he 
legitimately acquired by inventing, discovering (i.e., appropriating), or voluntarily 
exchanging property. 
The distinct value of Libertarianism, in the realm of contemporary theories of justice, 
is exactly to cast light on the process by which a given distribution is put in place, to 
the value of entitlements, rather than on the attractiveness of a particular social output. 
A persuasive comment by Jasay on Brian Barry is ironically entitled “Slicing the Cake 
Nobody Backed”: (15) we often hear opinionated debates on how the “cake” (as if 
wealth in the world existed but in a given proportion, and isn’t created but merely 
distributed) should be sliced, but seldom people deal with the process of backing the 
cake itself. 
Libertarianism, in a nutshell, is all about the backing. (16) 
Anarchists and miniarchists, sharing a common theory of justice, fundamentally 
disagree on the conditions under which property could be protected best. 
The protection of property is what anarchists emphasize: legitimate distribution should 
not suffer any kind of interference by an ultimate decision maker, even if the use of 
coercion is strictly limited. No matter how limited, it is illegitimate. But here comes the 
issue of law and order: should law be imposed as legislation upon a market (a society), 
or is it an output of claims and interactions within a market (a society) on its own right? 
And if we accept the second option, could the state be conceived as the enforcer of 
laws that it didn’t produce? 
Since Nozick’s opus magnum was published, libertarians engaged in different 
theoretical debates, supplying many insights thanks to a fairly relevant number of 
scholars. The first issue of the Journal of Libertarian Studies debated and debunked 
the first part of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, building on the theoretical consistency of 
the anarchist option. (17) Murray Rothbard’s and, more recently, Bruce Benson’s and 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s works on the private production of defense (18) made 
anarchy a much more attractive scenario. The existence of public goods and the 
necessity for their public provision have been questioned in a number of relevant 
works. (19) Philosophers such as Jan Narveson developed a consistent libertarian 
approach that is not strictly based on Natural Rights as understood by theorists of 
“Lockean rights” such as Nozick and Rothbard. (20) The issue of Natural Law and 
Natural Rights among libertarians has been largely debated, and a philosopher as 
prominent as Henry B. Veatch admitted that his interest in this field was prompted 
exactly by these disputes. (21) Perhaps, most important of all, libertarians can count in 
their ranks a philosopher as original as Anthony de Jasay, who has given many 
priceless insights: on the emergence of conventions and, most notably, on the respect 
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for property in a stateless society, on the problem of public goods, and on the 
feasibility of constitutionalism. (22)  
This last point is of the greatest importance. Libertarianism is often accused to be 
“utopian”, “politically unfeasible” (and so what?... We are tempted to say: political 
feasibility is merely contingent, and it doesn’t say much about the value of a theory), 
even “constructivist”. (23) The truth is rather the opposite: libertarian scholars in the 
no-government tradition merely apply the assumption of self-interest to government 
relationships. In that regard, it is worth noting that the most consistent approach to 
libertarianism has been developed in a stringent critique of so called “public choice” 
and “constitutional economics”. (24) Libertarianism is indeed based on a realist 
anthropology, which assumes fallibility, imperfection, and self-interest, and therefore 
rejects government: because people in government are as far from being angels as 
anyone is.  
Anarcho-capitalism bases most of its attractiveness on the fact that the “minimal state”, 
if ever existed, never remained “minimal”, but always grew larger. For the assumption 
of self-interest, government officials will always try to maximize their utility as anyone 
else. If so, keeping a state “small” is like trying to straighten the crooked wood of 
humanity.  
But debates among libertarians do not concern only the crucial theoretical question 
(should we be governed?) of political philosophy. Libertarians have debated on 
intellectual property, contracts, banking, and on many other issues. This is a grand 
proof of how lively this movement of ideas is, especially in the United States but – at 
least at an academic level – in Europe as well. 
This issue of Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics aims to provide the reader with a 
glimpse of all these sparkling debates.  
Jan Narveson defends the prospects of a stateless society vis-à-vis a minimal state, 
providing a new perspective on a hoary debate. Frank Van Dun explains the relevancy 
of natural law for anarcho-capitalism. Hardy Bouillon examines competing definitions 
of freedom, and supplies a new one. 
Hans-Hermann Hoppe deals with monetary issues and with what he calls “monetary 
imperialism”. Carlo Stagnaro defends the right to bring and carry guns as an essential 
part of the libertarian tradition of thought, rejecting the common objections raised by 
advocates of the monopoly of violence. Walter Block proposes the challenge of roads’ 
privatization. 
Guglielmo Piombini assesses the debate between the so-called “left-libertarianism” 
(25) and the so-called “paleo-libertarianism”, arguing for a reconciliation of laissez 
faire and traditional morality. By the same token, Paolo Zanotto examines the 
contributions of Juan de Mariana in the light of contemporary libertarian theory. 
Libertarians can provide new perspective on current affairs as well as social thought. 
Tom Palmer examines economic globalization from a libertarian perspective, and 
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reminds us of the robust link that connects cosmopolitanism and classical liberalism, 
criticizing at the time the attitudes shown by contemporary “communitarians”. Wendy 
McElroy proposes a different approach to feminism and gender issues, which builds 
upon the great truths of methodological individualism, which are central in any true 
libertarian perspective.  
An account of the most relevant libertarian scholarship is provided by Nicola Iannello, 
in his robust bibliographical essay. 
Those debates and disputes, the large number of scholars in fields such as political 
philosophy, economics, and social theory (not to mention journalists and political 
analysts) who are working within the libertarian framework, are truly impressive and 
confront all with a factual reality: libertarianism is no longer a philosophical 
eccentricity, but a stream of thought whose contributions to contemporary political 
philosophy can’t be simply ignored. 
Wishing that this issue of  Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics contributes to a serious 
debate in Italy over these themes, we would like to close this introduction by 
expressing the sincere hope that – at least at a theoretical level – a growing number of 
scholars would, in the coming years, recognize what Anthony de Jasay writes in this 
journal: 
 
Opportunism, not efficiency, is the motive force of the most important collective 
choices. Substantially all redistributive functions undertaken by the state can be 
explained by the fact that while people have unequal abilities and resources, they 
have equal votes, and resources can be taken from some and given to others by 
voting for the transfer. This is a naked truth, and it is not pretty. It is perhaps 
only human, but insincere, to prettify it by pretending that the net effect of these 
enforced transfers is to make us all wealthier and safer. (26) 
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